Now, this is characteristic of the ultimate end: it is sought for its own sake. Now, in the action of all agents, one may find something beyond which the agent seeks nothing further. So, the ultimate end of man is the knowledge of God. But this is impossible. For, just as the target is the end for th archer, so is it the end for the motion of the arrow. Indeed, forms and accidents cannot come into being from matter, since they do not have matter as one of their parts. [1] It can be shown from the foregoing that the last thing through which any real being is ordered to its end is its operation. But that later way of knowing divine things, not by means of the speculative sciences but by a process of generation in the natural order, was made up by some of his commentators. Thus, a blind man is an individual man, not inasmuch as he is blind but in so far as he is this man. [5] Hence it is that the Lord replies to Moses, when he asks for the vision of the divine substance: “I will show thee all good” (Exod, 33:19). And the Lord says: “I will manifest Myself to him” (John 14:21). Now, if it works this way, since everything that moves itself is alive and animated, it would follow that the heavens are animated, and by no other soul than an intellectual one: not by a nutritive soul, for generation and corruption are not within its power; nor by a sensitive soul, for a celestial body has no diversity of organs. [7] As a matter of fact, Augustine himself admits that truth is in the soul, in the Soliloquies, and as a result he proves the immortality of the soul from the eternity of truth. The same is evident even if they are in different subjects; for instance, those men who excel in operative power must be directed by those who excel in intellectual power. [6] Again, man naturally shrinks from death, and is sorrowful at its prospect, not only at the instant when he feels its threat and tries to avoid it, but even when he thinks back upon it. Now, we have already shown that felicity does not lie in an act of the will. Thus, a man who is destitute of virtue and host to vices is indeed called good, relatively speaking; that is, to the extent that be is a being, and a man. [7] Again, an intelligent agent acts for the sake of an end, in the sense that it determines the end for itself. Therefore, its loss holds the greatest prospect of sorrow. Since “it is impossible to proceed to infinity,” the agent could not begin to act, because nothing is moved toward what cannot be reached. THAT GOD GOVERNS THINGS BY HIS PROVIDENCE According as there is added a privation of a contrary form, and a contrary end, to a form and an end (which have the rational character of good and are true principles of action) the action that results from such a form and end is attributed to the privation and the evil. For the intellect and the will have no limits to their acts. [2] Again, the intellect and the senses differ on this point as is clear from Book III of On the Soul [4: 429a 14], the power to sense is destroyed, or weakened, by the more striking sense objects, so that later it is unable to perceive weaker objects; but the intellect, not being corrupted or hindered by its object but only perfected, after understanding a greater object of the intellect, is not less able to understand other intelligibles but more able. “For art in its working imitates nature,” and bad results occur in both in the same way. THAT HUMAN FELICITY DOES NOT LIE IN THE SENSES [6] Besides, the order of the effects follows the order of the causes. So, they would be able to pass judgment on the regulations that they have received, as to when action should accord with these regulations and when one should overlook them. And this defection of the good is evil, as we showed above. But this is not the kind of knowledge about God that the philosophers were able to get through demonstrations, because, even when we acquire this knowledge, we still desire to know other things that are not known through this knowledge. Now, all things are governed by divine wisdom. [5] Furthermore, the first source of motion must be something immutable. [6] Again, every agent is ordered through his operation to an ultimate end, for either the operation itself is the end, or the thing that is made, that is, the product of the operation. Indeed, the habitual understanding, as also the possible understanding, is supposed by Alexander to be generable and corruptible. [25] Moreover, it is not true that quantity impedes the action of a form, except accidentally; that is to say, in so far as all continuous quantity is in matter, and form existing in matter, having lesser actuality, is consequently less powerful in acting. So, nothing is evil by virtue of the fact that it has essence. Hence, when the will inclines to act as moved by the apprehension of reason, presenting a proper good to it, the result is a fitting action. Besides, though anything is good in so far as it is a being, it is not, however, necessary for matter which is merely potential being to be good only in potency. Since to tend to the good is common to the intelligent agent and to the agent that acts by natural instinct, evil does not result from the intention of any agent, except apart from the intention. [7] And since a cause, as such, is superior”to the thing caused, it is evident that to tend toward the divine likeness in the manner of something that causes others is appropriate to higher types of beings. The title, ‘Summa Contra Gentiles’ basically means, ‘Summation against the Unbelievers’; it is his defense of Catholic Christianity against non-Christians. Thus, privations are not intended by nature in themselves, but only accidentally; forms, however, are intended in themselves. For example, if someone intends to eat honey, but he cats poison, in the belief that it is honey, then this will be apart from the intention. Hence, a being which is infinite in this sense is most knowable in itself. [2] It must be, then, that the species of things caused and intended by the intellectual agent exist beforehand in his intellect, as the forms of artifacts pre-exist in the intellect of the artist and are projected from there into their products. Now, it becomes a form for us even through the first objects of speculative understanding, according to his own statement. [1] We should attend to the fact that two things are required for providence: the ordering and the execution of the order. Thus, an artisan who applies the power of a natural thing to some action is said to be the cause of the action; for instance, a cook of the cooking which is done by means of fire. Hence, they are not intelligible in a purposeless way, as the sun (to pursue Aristotle’s example) is visible, yet not in a purposeless way, simply because the owl cannot see it. The Summa contra Gentiles is divided into four books, the third book being subdivided into two parts. [1] Now, it appears that the preceding view may be opposed by certain arguments. However, lower bodies are not perfected in their natures without some contrariety. However, if it be the kind of privation which takes away what is due to the thing generated, this will be by chance and unqualifiedly evil, as in the case of the birth of monsters. [5] However, it is clear that Aristotle, whose view the aforementioned philosophers try to follow, did not think that man’s ultimate felicity is to be found in such a connection. Therefore, God by His providence governs and rules all things that are moved toward their end, whether they be moved corporeally, or spiritually as one who desires is moved by an object of desire. And this is plainly false, on the basis of what we have established. Whereas, according to the second opinion, the converse is the case, for, since it is united with us as a form, we understand it and the other separate substances. Now, it has been said that two principles precede the will in the order of moral actions: namely, the apprehensive power, and the object apprehended, which is the end. So, if all generation and corruption were removed as a result of taking away the contingency of things, as we showed, the consequence would be that even motion would be taken away from things, and so would all movable things. [4] Besides, since man is man by virtue of his possession of reason, his proper good which is felicity should be in accord with what is appropriate to reason. And so, may they who enjoy the same felicity whereby God is happy eat and drink at God’s table, seeing Him in the way that lie sees Himself. Such are the celestial bodies whose motions occur in ever the same way. Therefore, sach pleasures are not the highest good for man, that is, felicity. [2] One kind of operation pertains to a thing as the mover of another, as in the actions of heating or sawing. [3] Besides, an intellectual potency that is nearer to the principle is always capable of ruling an intellectual power that is more removed from the principle. Therefore, both the mover and the agent always intend the good in their movement and action. Thus, a heavy body in some unusual position is in potency to its proper place. Similarly, it cannot be a thing that is made, for the termination of every process of generation is a form, and a good thing. Hence, the evil of adultery is not something which results by chance. Hence, the end of their motion is to achieve the divine likeness by being perfected in themselves; for instance, by possessing their proper form and being in their proper place. Yet, if it were false and empty, felicity could not consist in such knowledge. It is in this way that an animal desires his proper good, inasmuch as he desires the procreation of offspring and the nourishment of the same, or the performance of any other work that is for the preservation or protection of individuals belonging to his species. [1] Now, it is clear from what we have said that it is impossible for human felicity to consist in bodily pleasures, the chief of which are those of food and sex. Now, nothing. And again: “She reaches from end to end mightily” (Wis. 8:1), that is, from the noblest creatures down to the lowest of them. [6] On this basis, then, the error of those who say that all rewards are equal is refuted. But evil is a specific difference in some genera; for instance, among habits and acts in the moral order. So, if this vision were to cease, bringing this union to an end, it would have to be done by a change in the divine substance, or in the intellect of the one who sees it. From this point of view, good and evil seem to be genera of all contraries. Still another operation is the perfection of an actually existing agent which does not tend to produce a change in another thing. [7] For this point Aristotle made use of an appropriate example, for the eye of an owl can never see the light of the sun; though Averroes tries to ruin this example by saying that the similarity between our intellect in relation to separate substances and the eye of the owl in relation to the light of the sun does not extend to impossibility, but only to difficulty. [5] Thus it is that, in order to indicate the variation in this felicity, the Lord says: “In My Father’s house there are many mansions” (John 14:2). [11] It is also evident from the foregoing that in celestial motion neither the approach to a certain place, nor the regression from that place, is against nature. In fact, it is the lowest in the order of intellects, yet its substance is raised above corporeal matter, not depending on it. [1] In the same way, it is also apparent that man’s highest good does not lie in the goods of his sensitive part. Now, every power in any agent is from God, as from a first principle of all perfection. [5] Moreover, evil acts only through the power of the good, as is clear from what has been established previously. [5] The same writer’s words seem to tend toward the same view, words which he puts in Book XII of The Trinity, saying the following: “It pertains to reason to judge concerning these bodily things in accord with the incorporeal and sempiternal reasons which, unless they were above the human mind, certainly would not be immutable.” Now, the immutable and sempiternal reasons cannot exist in any other location than in God, since only God, according to the teaching of our faith, is sempiternal. [5] First of all, we showed above that the possible intellect is not some substance separated from us in its being. For the created intellect to see God’s substance, then, the divine essence itself must be joined as an intelligible form to the intellect, as we have proved. Indeed, if the word all means whatever things pertain to the perfection of the universe, it is obvious from what has been said that those who see the divine substance do see all things, as the arguments that have just been advanced show. Now, because a thing is known from the point of view of what it is, that thing is also known in distinction from others; consequently, the definition which signifies what a thing is distinguishes the thing defined from all else. [3] Yet, because it is possible for evil to increase without limit, and because good is always decreased as evil increases, it appears that the good may be infinitely decreased by evil. Chapter 15 So, it is impossible for happiness, or felicity, to be the very act of the will. For, if the possible intellect is not a power which depends on matter, and again if it is separate in being from body, as Averroes supposes, then it follows that it has no necessary relation to material things. But the end that is produced by the action of the agent cannot be the first agent; it is, rather, the effect of the agent. Therefore, it considers actually at once all the things that it knows through this vision. [15] Furthermore, the perfection of the effect demonstrates the perfection of the cause, for a greater power brings about a more perfect effect. This is not possible for any man to know through the principles of the speculative sciences, by which principles we are moved to a connection with the agent intellect, as they say. For, since the divine simplicity is not equaled by any created substance, it is not possible for a created substance to have its entire perfection in the same identity; indeed, this is proper to God, as we showed in Book One [28], for He is being, understanding and blessed, identically. In fact, according to Gregory, Principalities are called, not those put in charge of peoples, but “who are given leadership even over good spirits,” as if they held first position in the execution of the divine ministrations. Now, an intellectual creature chiefly becomes like God by the fact that it is intellectual, for it has this sort of likeness over and above what other creatures have, and this likeness includes all others. Now, the human intellect has a greater desire, and love, and pleasure, in knowing divine matters than it has in the perfect knowledge of the lowest things, even though it can grasp but little concerning divine things. This is why we say that “evil has no efficient, but only a deficient, cause,” for evil does not result from an agent cause, unless because it is deficient in power, and to that extent it is not efficient.—And it reduces to the same thing if the defect in the action and in the effect arise from a defect of the instrument or of anything else required for the agent’s action; for example, when the motor capacity produces lameness because of a curvature of the tibia. But the perfection of intelligible being is present when the intellect reaches its ultimate end, just as the perfection of natural being consists in the very establishment of things in actual being. Then it is that we are said to be in motion toward the aforementioned connection, for, as more things are made to be actually understood within us, the agent intellect becomes more perfectly connected with us. Therefore, evil should not have been excluded from things by divine providence. Otherwise, all possible grades of goodness would not be realized, nor would any creature be like God by virtue of holding a higher place than another. Especially so is the vision by which it sees the divine substance. [8] Furthermore, among things that are properly regulated by providence there should be none incapable of fulfillment. ON THE ORDERING OF THE ANGELS AMONG THEMSELVES So, also, the good of a nation is more godlike than the good of one man. Thus, the whole area of generable and corruptible things would be removed from reality. For this reason it is said in Wisdom (7:11): “All good things came to me together with her.” Hence it is also said in the Psalm (111:3): “Glory and wealth shall be in His house.” So, in order that the agent intellect be joined with any person, he must actually understand all the natures of sensible things, and all their powers, operations, and motions, through speculative understanding. Now, the being of any thing is participated being, since no thing is its own act of being, except God, as we proved above. [3] Again, if the soul understands what it is, through itself, and if every man has a soul, then every man knows what soul is. It terminates in a privation inasmuch as it attains the form which it intends, and the privation of another form is a necessary result of this attainment. So, divine operation is related to the being of things as the motion of a corporeal mover is to the becoming and passive movement of the things that are made or moved. Thus, animals naturally nourish their young. [4] But Averroes tried to avoid this difficulty by the explanation which has been mentioned above, in connection with his opinion. [3] Again, the moral virtues have this purpose: through them the mean is preserved in the internal passions and in regard to external things. Moreover, He has granted being to other things, not by a necessity of His nature but according to the choice of His will, as has been made clear in our earlier explanations. This, in fact, becomes clear to anyone who thinks over particular instances. Therefore, man’s highest good does not lie in sense. Now, this is the order that Gregory retained. [1] Because there is very great difficulty in Alexander’s opinion, as a result of his supposition that the possible intellect in a condition of habituation is entirely corruptible, Averroes thought that be found an easier way to show that we sometimes understand separate substances. For external acts of this kind do not belong in the moral area, unless they are voluntary. So, the principle of its motion must be something that moves as a result of apprehension. Finally, it is obvious that the more the large number, and great importance, of the effects of a cause become known, the more does the causality of the cause, and its power, become known. Indeed, it would be foolish to make war merely for its own sake. But among evils, one may be worse than another. But we have shown that there is no succession in the aforesaid vision; instead, all things that are seen through it are seen at once, and in one view. So, the whole working of nature must be ordered by some sort of knowledge. For instance, the cause that gives weight to an elemental body also gives it downward motion. So, the divine wisdom is in control of ordering what, bow many, and what kind of effects proceed from His power, even down to the lowest things. But everything that occurs accidentally is reducible to that which is by itself. THAT THE CREATED INTELLECT DOES NOT COMPREHEND THE DIVINE SUBSTANCE [1] For such a noble vision, the created intellect must be elevated by means of an influx of divine goodness. However, the intellect, in itself, is peculiar to an intellectual nature. [6] Furthermore, every created thing is limited to some genus or species. And so, singulars come no more under the scope of divine providence in regard to their preservation in being than they do in regard to their other aspects. THAT THE END OF EVERYTHING IS A GOOD Hence, also, Aristotle, in Book III of On the Soul [4: 429a 2], demonstrates from the very act of understanding what is the nature of the possible intellect, namely, that it is “unmixed and incorruptible,” as is clear from what we have said earlier. Therefore, all that the intellect sees in the divine substance must be seen at once. Therefore, the rational plan of divine providence demands that other creatures be ruled by intellectual creatures. It is indeed a matter of greater dignity to oversee the planning of the order for certain things than for it to be produced in them. [2] For it does not seem possible for one action to proceed from two agents. Acting as their spokesman, Solomon says in Ecclesiastes (5:17): “This therefore seemed good to me, that a man should eat and drink and enjoy the fruit of his labor, and this is his portion”; and again in Wisdom (2:9): “let us everywhere leave tokens of joy, for this is our portion, and this our lot.” Summary One of Aquinas's best known works after the Summa Theologica, Summa Contra Gentiles is a theological synthesis that explains and defends the existence and nature of God without invoking the authority of the Bible. Therefore, no body is the cause of the being of anything, in so far as it is being, but it is the cause of its being moved toward being, that is, of the thing’s becoming. [2] For, the mover and the thing moved must be simultaneous, as the Philosopher proves. Therefore, all other creatures must be moved and regulated by means of intellectual powers. And so, when a person attains felicity he likewise attains stability and rest, and that is why this is the notion of all men concerning felicity, that it requires stability as part of its essential character. Now, the proper object of the intellect is that which is, that is, the substance of a thing, as is stated in Book III of On the Soul [4: 429b 10]. And this first philosophy is wholly ordered to the knowing of God, as its ultimate end; that is why it is also called divine science. Hence, the mind which sees the divine substance must be completely cut off from the bodily senses, either by death or by ecstasy. Thus limping arises from the motive power, in so far as it possesses something of motion, but in regard to what it has by way of defect it is due to the crookedness of the leg. For some things easily known in themselves are not, however, easily known in their causes. And this, in fact, must lead back to God, either mediately or immediately, since every lower art and type of knowledge must get its principles from a higher one, as we also see in the speculative and operative sciences. Therefore, delight is not the ultimate end, in the sense of felicity. So, if to understand separate substances be a perfection of the operation of the habitual intellect, it follows that the habitual intellect understands separate substances at some point in time. Thus, simultaneously with the generation of one thing there necessarily results the corruption of another thing. [4] Going along, then, with the civic life are certain goods which man needs for civic activities. So, an intellect cannot know what a volitional agent wills except, perhaps, through certain effects. However, it will be a matter of chance if this defect is rarely associated with this kind of agent. Therefore, every evil has a cause, in regard to which it is an accidental result. [1] As a matter of fact, human souls bold the lowest rank in relation to the other intellectual substances, because, as we said above,” at the start of their existence they receive a knowledge of divine providence, wherein they know it only in a general sort of way. Since only intellectual creatures can know the rational plans for the ordering of creatures, it will therefore be their function to rule and govern all other creatures. For it is by desire that the will tends toward what it does not yet possess, but this is contrary to the essential character of the ultimate end.—So, two, the act of loving cannot be the ultimate end. But these pleasures are not agreeable to man by virtue of what is noblest in him, namely, his understanding, but by virtue of his sense capacity. [4] Moreover, the knowledge which comes about through something naturally implanted in us is natural, as is the case with indemonstrable principles which are known through the light of the agent intellect. [3] Again, of two contraries, each is a definite nature, for, if one contrary were supposed to be nothing, then it would be either a privation or a pure negation. The same may be said of virtuous and vicious acts. [1] Since it is impossible for a natural desire to be incapable of fulfillment, and since it would be so, if it were not possible to reach an understanding of divine substance such as all minds naturally desire, we must say that it is possible for the substance of God to be seen intellectually, both by separate intellectual substances and by our souls. Therefore, the celestial bodies move and govern the lower bodies. Now, such is the proper knowledge that we have of God through demonstrations. Now, he is not called good, or bad, simply because he has power, for not everyone who can do good things is a good man, nor is a person bad because he is able to do evil things. Consequently, a thing that is more deprived of goodness is said to be more evil, as it were, more distant from the good. [4] Of course, someone could say that the ultimate end of an intellectual substance consists, in fact, in understanding the best intelligible object—not that the best object of understanding for this or that particular intellectual substance is absolutely the best intelligible object, but that, the higher an intellectual substance is, the higher will its best object of understanding be. Now, this is done when one makes available some good for those that have less, from the abundance of those that have more. When it is existing under the form of an element it is in potency to the form of a mixed body; that is why the elements are matter for the mixed body. [4] However, certain words of Augustine do present a difficulty; for it appears from them that we can understand God Himself in this life. But for all things which can be understood through it to be known is something which cannot happen without comprehending this substance, as is evident from what we have said. And Gregory says: “What do they not know, who know Him Who knows all things?” [17] However, Gregory assigns a different ordering to the celestial spirits; for he numbers the Principalities among the intermediate spirits, immediately after the Dominations, while he puts the Virtues among the lowest, before the Archangels. [5] Hence, when the habitual understanding will be perfected through the production in us by the agent intellect of these intelligible species, the agent intellect will itself become a form for us, as we have said. On the contrary, the later evil could be equal to, or greater than, the earlier evil; hence a proportionately smaller quantity of good would not always be subtracted by evil from the good in subsequent cases. [12] Hence it is that Sacred Scripture proclaims God as Lord and King, according to the text of the Psalm (99:2) : “The Lord, He is God”; and again: “God is the King of all the earth” (Ps. This pertains to the Archangels, of whom Gregory says: “they announce the most important things.” For instance, we call Gabriel an Archangel, because he announced the Incarnation of the Word to the Virgin, for the belief of all. Now, this cause is God, either mediately or immediately. 33:20-21). Of course, He could not do this if He refused to involve Himself immediately in the ordering of these singular things. Nor, indeed, can it be an end, for it is apart from intention, as we have proved. Therefore, to know God by an act of understanding is the ultimate end of every intellectual substance. [5] Moreover, every evil is the consequence of a good, as corruption is the result of an act of generation. Now, since evil could not be the product of a good thing, it is impossible for any being, as a being, to be evil. Therefore, evil is a result apart from intention. [7] Again, something which is not good unless it be moderated is not good of itself; rather, it receives goodness from the source of the moderation. Of course, it acts through itself, and so, through itself, it knows concerning itself that it is. Now, the enjoyment of the aforementioned pleasures is not good for man unless it be moderated; otherwise, these pleasures will interfere with each other. On the other hand, if the secondary and tertiary overseers receive particular regulations and laws from the highest overseer, then it is quite obvious that the ordering of these singulars is done immediately by divine providence. [5] Furthermore, nothing finite can fully satisfy intellectual desire. Therefore, the felicity of man should not be identified with honors. Of course, this can be understood not in reference to corporeal food or drink, but to Him who is received at the table of Wisdom, of whom Wisdom speaks: “Eat My bread and drink the wine which I have mingled for you” (Proverbs 9:5). [5] Moreover, what does not exist cannot be the cause of anything. So the things also that are of God, no man knows, but the Spirit of God” (1 Cor. But all men, while learning the truth, are always disposed as beings in motion, and as tending toward perfection, because men who come later make other discoveries, over and above those found out by earlier men, as is also stated in Metaphysics II [1: 993a 31]. It is now in the Vatican Library. Moreover, through the cognition of natural species the individuals existing under these species are known by the intellect that sees God, as can be made evident from what has been said above on the knowledge appropriate to God and the angels. 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